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INTRODUCTION
Transportation Alliance Bank ("TAB") filed suit against Defendants,
International Confections Company, NG Acquisition, and Michael Ryan,
and requested the immediate appointment of a receiver to preserve assets
that served as collateral for TAB's loan to Defendants. Bank of American
Fork and other creditors intervened to support the appointment of a
receiver and protect their interest in the collateral. In what is a recurring
pattern in this case, Defendants stipulated to the intervention, but now
argue that the district court erred by allowing intervention.
After a receiver had been appointed and the intervenors had entered
the case, TAB sought to unilaterally dismiss the entire case, thereby
terminating the receivership.

Intervenors objected.

Defendants then

stipulated that the receivership would remain in place, that the intervenors
could continue pursuing recovery from the receivership estate, and that the
receiver could continue to pursue a sale of the receivership assets - many
of which were perishable assets (chocolate, candy, confections, trail mix,
and other perishable products) that had to be sold quickly or would be lost.

v

But Defendants now claim that the district court erred by leaving the
receivership in place and allowing the case to move forward.
Defendants not only stipulated to the receivership continuing, they
praised the receiver for his good work and pre-approved a sale of the
receivership assets based on a pending offer, noting that they would also
approve any "better offer" that came along.

Having approved an

acceptable offer, Defendants seemed to have no interest in the details. Just
a few days later, even with an offer pending and time being of the essence,
Defendants stipulated to their attorney withdrawing.
Their attorney attempted to withdraw (his notice of withdrawal was
defective) on the same day the receiver filed a motion seeking expedited
approval of a significantly better offer he had received. A hearing was held
on the expedited motion. Defendants were aware of the hearing because
their purportedly withdrawn attorney continued to receive all notices and
the receiver had specifically notified Mr. Ryan about the hearing.
Defendants chose not to appear.

But

To be sure, Defendants might have

assumed that their attorney had properly withdrawn and that International
Confections and NG Acquisition could not appear without an attorney, but
Vl

Mr. Ryan could have appeared on his own behalf and asked for time to
retain a new attorney for his companies. But the reality is, Defendants
obviously didn't care enough about the details to be concerned about the
pending sale.

They made absolutely no effort and showed no concern

about the sale - at least there is nothing in the record.

The evidence

suggests that Defendants were simply content to let the sale move forward
in their absence. At the hearing, the receiver told the court that the offer
was for nearly $1 million more than the previous offer and that time was of
the essence because inventory was perishing and workers were leaving.
The court approved the sale.
Defendants accepted the benefits of the sale while remaining silent.
It was not until months later when a minor detail of the sale-some

standard release language- came back to bite them that Defendants
objected.

As the district court found, "Defendants did not have any

objection to the sale of the assets to Mrs. Fields until they were confronted
with the release language ... months later," a detail of the sale they did not
bother to concern themselves with.

(R.1455.)

In essence, Defendants

stipulated to the sale-not expressly as with their stipulation to
Vll

intervention, their stipulation to the receivership continuing, and their
stipulation to their attorney withdrawing- but by remaining silent while
the sale went forward.

Now, they contend that the court erred by

approving the sale.
The district court did not err in any aspect of this case. It did not lose
jurisdiction when TAB attempted to unilaterally dismiss the entire case
under Rule 41(a)(1). That rule was inapplicable because (1) Defendants
had responded to the complaint by opposing the appointment of a receiver
and allowing intervention; (2) the appointment of a receiver meant that
only the court could dismiss the case and terminate the receivership; and
(3) after intervention, TAB was not the only plaintiff in the case and could
not dismiss the claims of the intervenors. The district court had jurisdiction
and correctly concluded that the judgment was not void.
The district court's rejection of Defendants' other arguments is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard. And the district court plainly
did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendants failed to establish
"excusable neglect" or any other "reason justifying relief from the
judgment."

Finally, even if Defendants could establish grounds under
Vlll

Rule 60 for reversal, they would also have to show that they had a
"meritorious defense" that they would have raised. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendants did not have a
meritorious defense. Defendants' "defense" is an unmeritorious objection
to a single provision in an otherwise unobjectionable offer.

Not only

unobjectionable, but an offer that was for far more money than any other
offer the receiver received.
The district court did not commit reversible error. Bank of American
Fork asks this Court to affirm.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction exists under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(i).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue 1:

TAB filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal after (1)

Defendants had responded to the complaint by opposing the appointment
of a receiver, (2) a receiver had been appointed and, (3) several additional
parties (secured creditors) had intervened. After the Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal was filed, Defendants stipulated that the receivership would
remain open and that the intervenors could continue as plaintiffs under the
IX

original complaint filed by TAB. Did the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
deprive the district court of jurisdiction?
Standard of Review: "A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment
under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion," but
when the motion is based on lack of jurisdiction, it "becomes a question of
law upon which we do not defer to the district court." State Dept. of Social
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989).

Issue 2: Defendants contend that the attempted withdrawal of their
counsel and the failure of the other parties to send a notice to appear or
appoint counsel as required by Rule 74(c) constitutes a "reason justifying
relief from the judgment" under 60(b)(6). The district court rejected this
argument because the notice of withdrawal was defective; Defendants
continued to receive notice of pleadings and hearings and yet took no
action; Defendants were aware of and accepted the benefits of the sale to
Mrs. Fields; and the district court would have approved the sale even if
Defendants had objected.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by

denying Defendants motion to set aside the judgment based on the
withdrawal of Defendants' counsel?
x

Standard of Review:

"The district court judge is vested with

considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion
to set aside a judgment." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). "A
district court abuses its discretion only when its decision was against the
logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock
one's sense of justice ... or resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v.

Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, if 27 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Issue 3: Defendants contend that the judgment should be set aside
under Rule 60(b)(1) because their failure to object to the Sale Order was the
result of "excusable neglect."

The district court determined that

Defendants neglect was not excusable because Defendants were aware of
the receivership, aware of pending offers, aware that time was of the
essence, and had both actual notice and notice through their counsel of the
hearing at which the sale was approved.

The evidence shows that

Defendants simply chose not to object to the sale to Mrs. Fields and were
unconcerned until they learned about a single provision in the sale
agreement.

The district court also found that even if Defendants had
Xl

objected, they did not have a meritorious defense. Did the district court
abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment based on
excusable neglect?
Standard of Review:

"The district court judge is vested with

considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion
to set aside a judgment." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986).

/1

A

district court abuses its discretion only when its decision was against the
logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock
one's sense of justice ... or resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v.
Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ,-r 27 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:

This case is a dispute between a creditor,

Transportation Alliance Bank ("TAB"), and its debtors, International
Confections Company, LLC and NG Acquisition, LLC, (the "Companies"),
and Michael D. Ryan.

(R.1-234.) After TAB filed its complaint, several

additional creditors intervened:

Back Bay Investments, LC; Dynamic

Confections, Inc.; Wasatch Peak Holdings, LLC; Arcadia Holdings, LLC;
Xll

and Bank of American Fork (collectively the "Intervenors"). (R.422-30.) A
receiver was appointed and given control of the Companies. (R.663-76.)
Their assets were sold to Mrs. Fields.

(R.928-32.) After the sale of the

assets and the discharge of the receiver, Defendants moved to set aside the
district court's approval of the sale under Rule 60(b). (R.1016-32.) The
district court denied their motion. (R.1451-59.) This appeal followed.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: TAB' s complaint
was filed on October 21, 2014. (R.1-20.) TAB's third cause of action sought
the appointment of a receiver. (R.12-13.) TAB requested the immediate
appointment of a receiver to conserve the collateral that secured
Defendants' debt.

(R.0238-41.)

Defendants appeared through counsel,

Mark James, and opposed the appointment of a receiver. (R.392, R.662.)
Defendants stipulated to the Intervenors becoming parties to the case.
(R.422-24; R.429-30.)
The court granted the motion to appoint a receiver and gave the
receiver control over the Companies. (R.663-76.) Shortly thereafter, TAB
filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal.

(R.720.)

The receiver and the

Intervenors objected. (R.726-28; 734-37.) The district court held a hearing
Xlll

at which Defendants stipulated that TAB's claims would be dismissed, but
the receivership would remain in place, the Intervenors would continue as
plaintiffs under the third cause of action in TAB' s complaint, and the
receiver could continue to pursue a sale of the Companies' assets. (R.145253.)
On December 17, 2014, the receiver accepted an offer to sell the
Companies' assets to Mrs. Fields and signed an Asset Purchase Agreement,
pending approval by the court. (R.798-800.) The next day, the receiver
filed an Expedited Motion for Order of Sale of Receivership Assets and
Related Issues ("Expedited Motion").

(R.792-93.)

That same day,

Defendants' counsel, Mr. James, filed a Notice of Withdrawal. (R.787-89.)
A hearing was held on December 23, 2014, at which Defendants did not
appear. (R.926-27.) That same day the court entered an Order Granting
Expedited Motion for Sale of Receivership Assets and Approving the Sale
of the Assets Free and Clear of all Encumbrances ("Sale Order"). (R.92832.)

It is undisputed that the Sale Order was served on Defendants'

counsel. (R.935-37.)

XIV

On January 23, 2015, the court entered the Order on Motion to
Approve Receiver's Final Report and Accounting, Discharge Receiver, and
Close Estate-the final order closing the case. (R.1009-12.) Two months
later, March 23, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment
and Supporting Memorandum. (R.1016-32.) Defendants asked the court to
"reactivate the case and allow Defendants to file objections to the
Receiver's December 18, 2014 Expedited Motion .... " (R.1016.)
In a careful and thorough Ruling and Order issued on August 21,
2015, which followed a lengthy hearing, Judge Laura Scott denied
Defendants' motion.

(R.1450-59.)

Defendants filed a timely notice of

appeal. (R.1461-63.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 21, 2014, Plaintiff Transportation Alliance Bank ("TAB")
filed suit against International Confections Company, NG Acquisitions (the
"Companies"), and Michael D. Ryan (collectively "Defendants"), for breach
of certain loan agreements and other related causes of action.

(R.1-20.)

TAB' s third cause of action sought the appointment of a receiver to take
control of the Companies. (R.12-13.) On October 24, 2014, to avoid the loss
xv

of certain collateral that secured TAB's loan to Defendants, TAB filed a
Motion for Immediate Appointment of Receiver. (R.238-41.)
On November 4, 2014, Mark James of Hatch, James & Dodge,
appeared as counsel for Defendants.

(R.392.)

A day later, TAB and

Defendants stipulated to Bank of American Fork and several other of
Defendants' secured creditors intervening as a matter of right under Rule
24(a).1

(R.422-24.)

The court granted the motion, declaring that the

intervenors "are hereby deemed parties for all purposes." (R.429-30.) That
same day, the court issued an interim order that immediately appointed a
receiver. (R.432-36.) Nine days later, after a hearing, the court made the
appointment of the receiver permanent. (R.663-76.)
The receiver was instructed by the court to "immediately have and
take possession, custody, and control of the business and all of the assets of

1 Rule 24(a) provides: "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest
is adequately represented by existing parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a).
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... the Companies .... "

(R.664.) Among other things, the Receiver was

given authority to" sell, transfer, and liquidate the Assets .... " (R.664-65.)
Shortly thereafter, TAB filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with
Prejudice, which purported to "voluntarily dismiss[ ] this action against
Defendants .... " (R.720.) The notice made no mention of the receiver or the
Intervenors.

Bank of American Fork filed an objection the next day.

(R.726-28.) Bank of American Fork pointed out that Rule 41(a) does not
allow dismissal where: (1) a receiver has been appointed and the court has
entered an order specifying the conditions under which the receiver could
be relieved of his duties, (2) dismissal would not be in the best interest of
the receivership estate, (3) creditors with an interest in the receivership
estate have been allowed to intervene by stipulation of the parties; and (4)
Defendants have made substantive filings in the case. (R.726-28.) Another
intervenor also objected and added additional reasons why unilateral
voluntary dismissal should not be allowed under Rule 41(a). (R.734-37.)
Defendants filed their reply to these objections the next day. (R.750-54.)
The court held a hearing on the matter on December 3, 2014, at which
Defendants appeared through their attorney, Mark James. (R.765.) At that
xvn

hearing, Defendants stipulated that the Intervenors would continue as
plaintiffs, the receiver would remain in place, and the Companies' assets
could be sold. Defendants' counsel told the court:
What we have resolved - and what the motion - the
objection to the dismissal revolved around was whether that
would mean the receiver does or does not stay in place. The
agreement we've reached is this: that Mr. Goates [the receiver],
will stay in place, that my clients [Defendants] will support the
sell [sic] of the assets at issue to a third party who has made an
offer, a third party named BBX. Or if Mr. Goates receives a
better offer from another third party, my client will support
that. Otherwise, the parties reserve all other rights.
(R.1452.)
The court asked Defendants' counsel specifically what the parties'
agreement does to the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal and whether the
"motion to dismiss will take care of TAB but not the Intervenors." (R.1452.)
Defendants' counsel responded that the case would remain pending with
respect to the Intervenors:
I think that we would stipulate . . . that the case is
dismissed as with respect to the causes of action filed by TAB.
We would agree that for purposes of the receivership the case
can remain open as to the other intervening creditors .... As a

XV Ill

result of the good work by Mr. Goates. He's convinced us all
he can do his job.
(R.1453.)
The court signed an order on December 11, 2014, that had been
approved by Defendants which stated: "The intervening creditors in this
case are substituted as plaintiffs under the third cause of action in the
complaint only, and the case shall remain pending .... The November 11,
2014 Order Approving the Immediate Appointment of Receiver ... remains
in full force and effect." (R.780.)
The receiver had already received one offer - from BBX Sweet
Holdings.

(R.798.)

As noted, at the hearing on December 3, 2014,

Defendants' counsel said Defendants "will support" a sale to BBX or any
other "better offer." (R.1452.) A second offer soon came from Mrs. Fields
Confections, LLC.

(R.00798.)

This offer was "nearly a million dollar

increase" over the BBX offer. (R.1501.) In accordance with Defendants'
stipulation, the receiver accepted the better offer from Mrs. Fields and on
December 17, 2014, signed an Asset Purchase Agreement on behalf of the
Companies. (R.798-800.)

XIX

The next day, December 18, 2014, the receiver filed an Expedited
Motion for Order of Sale of Receivership Assets and Related Issues
("Expedited Motion").

(R.792-93.) The accompanying memorandum

identified Mrs. Fields as the buyer and stated that a copy of the Asset
Purchase Agreement would be provided upon request.

(R.798.)

The

memorandum also summarized the terms of the agreement and explained
that the Assets were encumbered by more than $3 million in secured debt;
that Mrs. Fields had agreed to pay $2.15 million; and that this was "the
highest and best offer he believes he could receive." (R.799, R.801.) The
Asset Purchase Agreement contained a standard release provision:
Effective upon the Closing of the sale that is the subject of this
Agreement, Seller on his own behalf and on behalf of the
Companies waives and releases any and all claims he or the
Companies may have against the Buyer and its employees,
officers, directors, members, affiliates, and agents except for
claims arising under this Agreement.
(R.897.)
The Notice of Hearing that accompanied the Expedited Motion stated
that objections must be filed by December 22, 2014, and that a hearing
would be held on the Expedited Motion on December 23, 2014. (R.884-86.)
xx

The same day the Expedited Motion and Notice of Hearing was filed,
Defendants' counsel, Mark James, filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel.
(R.787-89.) The Notice of Withdrawal did not contain Defendants' current
address, as required by Rule 74. (R.787-88.) It also does not state that no
motions were pending, which Rule 74 also requires. (R.787-88.) The Notice
of Withdrawal was filed at 2:42 p.m.

(R.790.)

Nothing in the record

indicates precisely when the Expedited Motion was filed. The district court
explained:

"Although it is

unclear which was filed

first,

the

contemporaneous filing of the Motion to Expedite resulted in a pending
motion that precluded counsel for Defendants from withdrawing without
an order from the Court." (R.1456.) What is undisputed is that Defendants
were aware of the receiver's efforts to market the Companies' assets and
that an offer from BBX was pending- an offer Defendants had approved.
It is also undisputed that Defendants' counsel received notice of the

Expedited Motion and the Notice of Hearing, and therefore became aware
that the receiver had accepted an offer from Mrs. Fields on the same day he
attempted to withdraw. (R.888-89.)

XXl

On December 22, 2014, the receiver filed a proposed Order Granting
Expedited Motion with the Asset Purchase Agreement attached. (R.91721.)

Defendants' counsel received this proposed order.

hearing was held on December 23, 2014.

(R.922-25.)

(R.00926-27.)

A

Defendants

received notice but did not respond to the Expedited Motion or appear at
the hearing. (R.926; R.1499-1500.) Counsel for the receiver also told the
district court that Mr. Ryan has "been in communication with the receiver
... so he does know that this was coming down today." (R.1500.) Having
learned that Defendants were aware of the hearing and had chosen not to
appear, the district court proceeded. (R.1499-1500.)
The receiver explained at the hearing the need for haste:
[W]e have a little bit of a melting ice cube issue here. The
inventory is aging. It's seasonal. Employees are out of work.
There's a concern that to get the most value from this company
we do need to strike quickly to preserve the possibility of the
employees coming back to work for the purchaser and the
assets becoming productive once again.
(R.1502.)
Because of the need for speed, at the receiver's request the court
entered the Sale Order that same day approving the sale.
xxn

(R.928-32;

R.1503.) It is undisputed that the Sale Order was served on Defendants'

counsel. (R.935-37.)
The receiver's final accounting was submitted to the court on January
7, 2015, along with a notice of hearing. (R.963; R.967-73.) On January 23,
2015, the court entered approved the receiver's final report, authorized

payment of his fees, and closed the estate- effectively ending the case.
(R.1009-11.) It is undisputed that Defendants' counsel continued to receive

notice of all filings in the case until the very end. (R.966; 1006-08; 1012-15.)
On March 9, 2015, Defendants filed a complaint against Mrs. Fields
Franchising, an affiliate of Mrs. Fields Confections (the purchaser) in the
Southern District of Ohio alleging the unlawful termination of a licensing
agreement. (R.1039-48.) Although Defendants' counsel had purportedly
withdrawn from this case, Defendants' allegations in their lawsuit against
Mrs. Fields make it clear that they continued to track this case and were
aware of the sale to Mrs. Fields. Defendants' complaint in their lawsuit
against Mrs. Fields Franchising alleged:
31. Mrs. Fields ... knew that International Confections
was expanding its business and had a line of credit with TAB
Bank.
Mrs. Fields . . . falsely notified TAB Bank that
XXlll

International Confections had defaulted under the License
Agreement, despite having no duty to notify TAB Bank of any
alleged default.
32. As a result, TAB Bank petitioned to have
International Confections taken into receivership in Utah. A
receivership proceeding was opened.
33. Although International Confections was able to
reach a resolution with and pay TAB Bank, another creditor
[the Intervenors] of International Confections called its loan.
34. While International Confections had been
effectively able to manage debt, it could not afford to pay all of
its outstanding loan[s] at one time. Accordingly, the receiver
put International Confections' assets up for sale.
35. Mrs. Fields' Confections, LLC, an affiliate of Mrs.
Fields Franchising, purchased International Confections' assets
through the receivership sale.
defendants'
actions
have
prevented
36. The
International Confections from continuing its business
operations, resulting in the loss of tens of millions of dollars in
profits.
(R.1045-46.)
In response to the lawsuit, counsel for Mrs. Fields Franchising
provided Defendants with a copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement and
claimed that the release provision barred Defendants' claim. (R.1035-36.)
Defendants dismissed their lawsuit against Mrs. Fields Franchising.
XXIV

On March 23, 2015, Defendants filed, in this case, a Motion for Relief
from Judgment and Supporting Memorandum. (R.1016-32.) Defendants
asked the court to "reactivate the case and allow Defendants to file
objections to the Receiver's December 18, 2014 Expedited Motion .... "
(R.1016.) In a careful and thorough Ruling and Order issued on August 21,
2015, which followed a lengthy hearing, Judge Laura Scott denied
Defendants' motion.

(R.1450-59.)

Defendants filed a timely notice of

appeal. (R.1461-63.)

xxv

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The judgment is not void.

Defendants first contend that the

judgment is void because the district court lost jurisdiction when TAB filed
its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, and should therefore be set aside under
Rule 60(b)(4). TAB's attempted dismissal did not deprive the district court
of jurisdiction for at least three reasons:

First, Defendants had filed a

"response" to the complaint, which is all Rule 41(a)(1) requires, meaning
TAB could not withdraw without an order from the court. Second, the
appointment of a receiver meant that the case could not be dismissed
without an order from the court. Utah law makes clear that the court, not
the parties, controls the discharge of a receiver. Third, a plaintiff cannot
unilaterally dismiss if there are other plaintiffs in the case, and the
Intervenors were plaintiffs in this case. With Defendants stipulation and
approval, Intervenors were expressly recognized as plaintiffs and adopted
TAB' s pleading.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
that the attempted withdrawal of Defendants' counsel is not a "reason
justifying relief from the judgment." Defendants second argument is that

1

a moratorium should have been imposed when their attorney attempted to
withdraw and that the failure of the remaining parties to serve a notice on
Defendants to appear or appoint counsel is a "reason justifying relief from
the judgment" under Rule 60(b)(6).

The Notice of Withdrawal was

defective because it did not contain a forwarding address for Defendants
and failed to state whether there were any motions pending.

It is

undisputed that Defendants' counsel continued to receive notice of all
motions and hearings. Additionally, the moratorium is not unbreakable a court can set aside the moratorium and move forward if necessary. In
this case, the receiver presented the best offer he was going to receive,
Defendants had pre-approved the sale, and the sale had to happen quickly.
Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it refused to set aside the judgment because of the attempted
withdrawal of Defendants' counsel.
The district court's conclusion that Defendants did not exercise
"excusable neglect" was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendants third

argument is that their failure to object to the Sale Order was the result of
"excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(l). The Defendants have to show that

2

they exercised due diligence under the circumstances. There is no evidence
in the record that Defendants exercised any diligence, especially under
these circumstances. Defendants were aware that the receiver had received
an offer and was actively trying to sell the property. Defendants knew that
a sale needed to happen quickly. Mr. Ryan was told by the receiver about
the hearing at which approval of a sale would be sought, and Mr. Ryan did
not appear or object. Defendants knew about the sale to Mrs. Fields, yet
made no effort to discover the details. Defendants accepted the benefits of
that sale without objecting. The district court did not abuse its discretion
when it concluded that Defendants failure to object to the Sale Order was
/1

not the result of excusable neglect."
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Defendants did not have a meritorious defense. Unless the district court
lacked jurisdiction, Defendants must also show that they had a
11

meritorious defense." Defendants have offered no defense to the actual

sale of the Companies' assets. There is no dispute that Mrs. Fields offer
was the best and highest offer based on arms' length negotiations that
resulted in a commercially reasonable sale.
3

Even now, Defendants say

their only objection is to the standard release provision, but this is not a
meritorious objection.

There is no doubt the district court would have

approved the sale even if Defendants had objected to this provision-and
would have been correct to do so.
ARGUMENT
Rule 60(b) offers parties a narrow path for escaping a final order or
judgment:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
1n furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ... ; (3) fraud
... ; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, discharged, or a prior judgment on which it is based
has been reversed, or otherwise vacated ... ; (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Defendants contend (1) that the judgment is void under 60(b)(4)
because the district court lost jurisdiction when TAB filed its Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal; (2) the continuation of the proceedings after the
/1

attempted withdrawal of Defendants' counsel is a reason justifying relief
4

from the judgment" under 60(b)(6); and (3) Defendants' failure to object to
the sale was the result of" excusable neglect" under 60(b)(l). None of these
arguments has merit.
The jurisdictional issue is reviewed de novo. See State Dept. of Social

Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). The district court is granted
/1

substantial deference on the other two issues.

[T]he standard of review

for the denial of [a Rule 60(b)] motion focuses heavily on the highly
discretionary nature of such a decision." Asset Acceptance LLC v. Stocks,
2016 UT App 84,

if 11.

"The district court judge is vested with considerable

discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion to set aside a
judgment." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986).

/1

A district court

abuses its discretion only when its decision was against the logic of the
circumstances and so arbitrary and umeasonable as to shock one's sense of
justice . . . or resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice."

Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39,
omitted).

if

Jones v.

27 (citation and internal quotation marks

Because of this broad discretion,

/1

the outcome of rule 60(b)

motions are rarely vulnerable to attack." Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, i-f 7.

5

I.

The district court did not lose jurisdiction when TAB attempted to
voluntarily dismiss the case.
Defendants' first argument is that the judgment is void because the

district court automatically lost jurisdiction when TAB filed a Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal on November 24, 2014. "A judgment is void under
rule 60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter or parties .... " Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC, 2012 UT 6,

ii 18

(quotation marks omitted).
A.

Defendants responded to the complaint, making Rule 41(a)(l)
ina pp lica b le.

Rule 41(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to dismiss the action without a court
order only "before service by the adverse party of an answer or other

response to the complaint permitted under these rules." Utah R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1) (emphasis added). Once a defendant has filed "an answer or other
response," an order from the court is required. Defendants contend that
TAB' s attempted dismissal was effective because they had not filed an
"answer or other response" to TAB' s complaint.
But they had. In response to the complaint, on November 4, 2014,
Defendants'

counsel,

Mark James, filed
6

a

notice

of appearance.

Additionally, the third cause of action in TAB' s complaint sought the
appointment of a receiver.

In response to the complaint, Defendants'

counsel appeared at a hearing and contested the appointment of a receiver.
(R.432-33.) And in response to TAB's third claim for relief requesting that a
receiver be appointed, Defendants filed an objection and proposed changes
to the proposed order appointing the receiver. (R.525-026.) Defendants'
counsel then appeared at a hearing to argue over the objections to the
proposed order. (R.662.) This was all in "response to the complaint" as
contemplated by Rule 41(a).
Defendants also responded to the complaint by filing a stipulated
motion to allow intervention.
right" under Rule 24(a).

(R.422-23.) Intervention was sought "as of
By stipulating to intervention, Defendants

acknowledged that Intervenors had "an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action" as set forth in the complaint.
Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a). Thus, the stipulation to allow intervention was very
much a "response" to the allegations in the complaint.
Defendants suggest that these are not the type of "responses"
required by Rule 41(a)(1). But Rule 41(a)(1) says "response" not "pleading"
7

as that term is used in Rule 7.

And one reason Rule 41 cuts off the

plaintiff's right to unilaterally dismiss a complaint when the defendant has
filed an answer "or other response" is that many responses besides an
answer require the defendant to incur costs and fees, and the plaintiff
should not be able to unilaterally cut off the defendants right to seek
recovery of costs and fees.
In short, a plaintiff cannot unilaterally dismiss a case if a "response"
to the complaint has been filed. TAB responded to the complaint in several
filings-not an answer or a motion to dismiss, but Rule 41(a)(1) does not
require such a response. Thus, Rule 41(a)(1) was inapplicable when TAB
attempted to unilaterally dismiss the entire case.
B.

The appointment of a receiver made Rule 41(a)(1)
inapplicable by making it impossible for dismissal to occur
without a court order.

Over Defendants' objection, a receiver was appointed and instructed
to "immediately ... take possession, custody, and control of the business
and all of the assets of ... the Companies .... " (R.664.) The receiver was
given broad authority over the Companies and their assets-essentially
taking full control of the day-to-day operation of the Companies. (R.6648

68.) The receiver was instructed to file and serve upon the parties within
/1

30 days an initial written report and then monthly reports thereafter of
operations reflecting income and expense, and including a summary of fees
and administrative costs and expenses of Receiver and other professionals
employed by Receiver .... "

(R.670.) And all of the Receiver's fees and

/1

expenses had to be submitted to the Court for approval and confirmation"
to be paid out of the Companies' assets. (R.671.)
All of this made it impractical, if not impossible, for the receiver to be
discharged without oversight and approval from the district court. The
district court would have to receive a report of what actions the receiver
had taken during his appointment, how those actions had affected the
Companies, and what effect termination of the receivership would have.
At the very least, the court would have to approve payment of the
receiver's costs and fees out of the Companies' assets. If Defendants are
correct that the district court immediately lost jurisdiction when the Notice
of Dismissal was filed, then the receiver would not be able to submit a final
accounting and receive authorization of payment.

9

Additionally, the order appointing the receiver specifically states the
conditions upon which he would be discharged:
Receiver shall relinquish possession and control of the
Companies and the Assets upon: (1) entry of an Order from this
Court discharging Receiver from his duties; (2) upon the sale of
substantially all of the Assets, pending approval of Receiver's
final account and report to the Court; (3) a stipulation executed
by all of the parties to this Action requesting that the Receiver
relinquish possession and control of the Companies and the
Assets; or (4) upon the Receiver filing a petition with the Court
resigning his position [as] Receiver.
(R.675.) The order adds: "Receiver or the parties to this Action may at any
time apply to this Court for any further orders, or relief, including an order
to terminate the receivership .... " (R.675-76.) None of these conditions
were met by TAB's Notice of Voluntary Dismissal.
Finally, Utah law makes it clear that the court, not the parties,
controls the discharge of a receivership. In Shaw v. Robison, 537 P.2d 487
(Utah 1975), the plaintiff and defendant were equal owners of a
corporation. When differences arose between them, one sued the other and
moved for the appointment of a receiver. A receiver was appointed. "The
two parties later settled their difficulties and jointly moved the court to

10

terminate the receivership."

Id. at 488. The court denied their motion

allowing the receivership to continue, even though the parties had settled
their dispute. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed because the termination
of a receivership is within the court's sole control and requires the court to
consider the interests of all parties, which in this case would include the
Intervenors:
A receivership is an equitable matter and is entirely
within the control of the court. The fact that the parties
requested a termination of the matter in the midst of the
proceedings does not compel the court to "about face" and
cease all matters instanter.
In determining whether to continue a receivership or
discharge the receiver the court will consider the rights and
interests of all parties concerned, and will not grant an
application for discharge merely because it is made by the party
at whose instance the appointment was made.

Id. at 490 (internal citation omitted).
In other words, the court-not the parties-controls the discharge of
a receiver. And once a receiver is appointed, the party that sought the

11

appointment cannot unilaterally discharge the receiver, which would be
the effect of a Rule 41(a)(l) dismissal. 2
In this case, the district court was within its right to refuse to
terminate the receivership.
companies.

The receiver had taken over control of the

Such an abrupt termination without court oversight could

have prejudiced the Intervenors or others, and might have had serious
consequences to the Companies. And, again, at the very least, the court
needed receive a report from the receiver and a final accounting of costs
and fees.

In short, once a receiver was appointed, Rule 41(a)(l) no longer

allows the plaintiff who requested and received appointment of the
receiver to unilaterally terminate the case and, thereby, the receivership.
C.

Intervention made Rule 41(a)(1) inapplicable.

The third reason that Rule 41(a)(l) was inapplicable when TAB
attempted to terminate this case is that the Intervenors had joined the case.
Defendants concede that "[i]f a case has multiple plaintiffs, one plaintiff

Defendants point out that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
rules of some states expressly prohibit dismissal under Rule 41(a)(l) once a
receiver has been appointed. Aplt. Br. at 24. These rules merely make
express what is already the inherent result of the appointment of a receiver.
12
2

cannot terminate the whole case by a notice or stipulation of dismissal."
(R.1215.) Defendants assert that TAB "was the only plaintiff" when it filed
the notice of voluntary dismissal. Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendants do not ignore
the presence of the Intervenors, they argue that (1) the Intervenors did not
file a pleading as required by Rule 24(c) and therefore were not "parties" in
the case, and (2) even if Intervenors were parties, they had not been
identified as plaintiffs. Neither argument is persuasive.
A plaintiff can dismiss a case under Rule 41(a)(1) "during the
pend ency of a motion to intervene" because "the proposed intervenors do
not become parties within the meaning of [Rule 41(a)] until their motion is
granted." 8 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 41.34[4][b]
(3d ed. 20313). But the calculation changes once the motion to intervene is
granted. The intervenor "becomes a full participant in the lawsuit and is
treated just as if it were an original party." Alvarado v.

J.C.

Penney Co., 997

F.2d 803, 805 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Coal of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable
Econ. Growth v. Dep't of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1996) ("If a

party has the right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), the intervenor becomes
no less a party than others and has the right to file legitimate motions .... ").
13

And there is a

/1

strong policy . . . not to allow the original parties in an

action to effectively eliminate an intervenor's claims when that intervenor
has been made a party to the action as a matter of right." Steiner v. County
of Marshall, 568 N.W.2d 627, 635 (S.D. 1997).

Defendants argue that the Intervenors did not properly intervene
because they "never filed a pleading as Rule 24 requires, and therefore
never established themselves as plaintiffs." Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendants are
wrong for two reasons:

First, viewed properly, what Defendants are

appealing is the trial court's decision to allow intervention in the first place.
But Defendants stipulated to intervention without objecting to the absence
of a pleading and are therefore prohibited from arguing that the order
allowing intervention was in error.

/1

[A] party cannot take advantage of an

error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing
the error." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,

ii 17 (quotation marks omitted).

Defendants will argue that their stipulation is irrelevant because
jurisdiction cannot be stipulated to. But that puts the cart before the horse.
TAB' s attempted dismissal deprived the court of jurisdiction only if
intervention was improper.

And because Defendants stipulated to
14

intervention without objecting to the absence of a pleading, they cannot
object now that intervention was improper.

Because intervention was

proper, the Intervenors became full-fledged parties to the case. 3
But even if Defendants did not waive their argument that
intervention was improper because the intervenors did not file a pleading,
abundant case law establishes that the failure to file a pleading 1s a
technical defect that should be overlooked in the absence of prejudice. "An
intervenor's failure to comply with the requirement for filing a pleading is
a purely technical defect which does not result in the disregard of any
substantial rights." 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 184. As a prominent
treatise states: "If the intervenor is content to stand on the pleading an
existing party has filed, it is difficult to see what is accomplished by adding
to the papers in the case a new pleading that is identical in its allegations
Numerous courts have held unilateral voluntary dismissal under Rule
41(a) is not allowed after intervention by additional parties. See Wheeler v.
Am. Home Prod. Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that Rule
41(a)(1) does not authorize dismissal of the entire case by the original
plaintiff where intervening plaintiffs did not consent); Univ. of South
Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 178 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that
attempted notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) was ineffective
where "it was by no means clear that the proper plaintiff" filed the notice).
15
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with one that is already in the file." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure,§ 1914 (3d ed. 2009).
In Barnes v. Harris, 783 F.3d 1185, (10th Cir. 2015), the FDIC
intervened in an action filed in state court and then, without having filed a

pleading, removed the case to federal court based on a statute conferring
federal jurisdiction over any case in which the FDIC was a "party." The
plaintiff objected that the FDIC could not be a party without having filed a
pleading.

The Tenth Circuit rejected that argument.

"Treating an

intervening entity as a party even if that entity has not filed a pleading is
consonant with the Federal Rules." Id. at 1191. See also Alvarado, 997 F.2d
at 805 (intervenor did not file a pleading but was still considered "a full
participant in the lawsuit" and had to be treated "just as if it were an
original party"). This same permissiveness has been followed in numerous
jurisdictions. See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829,
834 (8th Cir. 2009) (intervenor "did not submit a pleading" but its motion
to intervene" satisfied Rule 24(c) because it provides sufficient notice to the
court and the parties of MIEC' s interests"); United States v. State of Louisiana,
543 F.2d 1125, 1128 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to file complaint with motion
16

to intervene "did not prejudice the parties" where intervenor's interest was
clear).
In sum, courts do not require parties to "comply strictly with the
requirements of Rule 24(c)," but rather, "the proper approach is to
disregard non-prejudicial technical defects." Spring Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Harris, 614 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that failure to file a

pleading was not fatal where petition to intervene and accompanying
affidavit "set forth sufficient facts and allegations to apprise Spring of
LITC's claims"); see also Mass. v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1236 n.19
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ("procedural defects in connection with intervention
motions should generally be excused by a court") (quotation marks
omitted).
One more case solidifies the point.

In Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.

Mendez, 585 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2009), Northwest Airlines obtained a $10

million default judgment against Phil Mendez. Mendez never notified his
insurer, Westchester Fire Insurance Company, about the claim.

When

Westchester was notified, it filed a declaratory judgment action asking the
court to declare that no coverage existed. Northwest intervened in that
17

lawsuit for the obvious reason of arguing that there was coverage so that it
could collect its judgment from the proceeds of the insurance policy. But
Northwest never filed a pleading. Mendez failed to answer an amended
complaint and, over Northwest's objection, a default judgment was entered
declaring that no coverage existed.
Northwest appealed. Westchester argued on appeal that "because
Northwest did not file an answer or a complaint and did not adopt any
pleading filed by another party, it had no interest to assert." Id. at 1888.
The court said this argument was "both inconsistent with precedent and
lacking in logic."

Id.

"Northwest's interest is obvious," the court

explained,
It wants to be able to collect its judgment against Mendez from
the Westchester insurance policy and it cannot do that if

Westchester is not liable under that policy. That interest was
explicitly identified in Northwest's motion to intervene .... The
district court recognized Northwest's interest, and it granted
the motion to intervene.

Id. The court of appeals reversed, holding that even though Northwest had
not filed a pleading, the district court erred in granting default judgment
against the named defendant and dismissing the case.
18

Likewise, in this case, Intervenors' interest was obvious: a receiver
had been appointed to take control of the collateral that secured their loans
to Defendants. The Intervenors wanted to get paid. Defendants obviously
recognized this interest when they stipulated to the intervention, and the
court recognized it when it granted the motion to intervene.

As in

Westchester, Defendants in this case "offer[ ] no substantive argument that

[Intervenors] do[ ] not have an actual interest." Id. They" simply seek[ ] to
capitalize on [Intervenors'] failure to file a pleading .... "

Id.

But the

"failure to comply with the Rule 24(c) requirement for a pleading is a
'purely technical' defect which does not result in the 'disregard of any
substantial right."' Id. (quoting Shores v. Hendy Realization Co., 133 F.2d 738,
742 (9th Cir. 1943).4
This leads to Defendants last argument, which is that even if
intervention was proper, Intervenors had not identified themselves as

4 The federal court cases cited in this section obviously are not controlling,
but Utah's appellate courts "recognize the persuasiveness of federal
interpretations when state and federal rules are similar and few Utah cases
deal with the rule in question." Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036,
1039 n.5 (Utah 1994).
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plaintiffs and, therefore, TAB was still the only one plaintiff and could

unilaterally dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1). This argument also fails.
Intervenors quite obviously intervened as plaintiffs. They supported
TAB in its efforts to have a receiver appointed. And there is no conceivable
reason why they would have intervened as defendants in an action filed by
TAB.

Finally, any possible confusion was clarified when Defendants

stipulated that Intervenors were plaintiffs in the case and could continue to

pursue the third cause of action in TAB's complaint. (R.780, R.1453.)
The failure to attach a pleading is a technical defect that "may easily
be resolved." Diagnostic Devices, Inc. v. Taidoc Technology Corp., 257 F.R.D.
96, 101 (W.D.N.C. 2009).

It was easily resolved in this case.

In fact,

Defendants stipulated that Intervenors were plaintiffs and that they could
adopt the third cause of action in TAB' s complaint.

That stipulation

resolved any technical defects.
Plaintiffs support their position with Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT App
56, where this court explained that when Rule 41(a)(1) is "properly"
invoked the action becomes "'a nullity' -it is as though 'the action had
never been brought"' and the court "would lack jurisdiction to proceed any
20

further with the action." Id.

ii 24 (quoting Barton v.

Utah Transit Auth., 872

P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1994). But this only shows why Rule 41(a)(l) was not
"properly" invoked in this case. By the time TAB attempted to invoke Rule
41(a)(l), Defendants had responded to the complaint by entering an
appearance and opposing the appointment of the receiver; Defendants had
stipulated to allowing several additional parties to intervene; and the
receiver had been appointed and had assumed control over Defendants'
businesses and assets. A simple voluntary notice of dismissal could not
render all of this a "nullity" - and especially not the appointment of a
receiver, for the reasons explained.
At most, TAB's notice of voluntary dismissal was effective only as to
TAB's claims, but not as to the interests of the Intervenors. Rule 41(a)(l)
permits dismissal of less than an entire action, '"whether it is fewer than all
the defendants against whom a dismissal is sought to be taken, or fewer
than all the plaintiffs who seek to withdraw from the action."' Pedrina v.
Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 610 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Moore's Fed. Prac.

ii

41.06-1 (2d ed. 1992)). And this is precisely what the end result was in this
case. In fact, it is what Defendants stipulated to.
21

In sum, TAB's attempted dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) was
ineffective, at least as to Intervenors, because: (1) Defendants had
responded to the complaint; (2) a receiver had been appointed and could
only be discharged by an order from the court; and (3) TAB was not the
only plaintiff in the case and had no right to dismiss the interests of the
Intervenors.
II.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reverse
the judgment based on the attempted withdrawal of Defendants'
counsel.
Defendants next argue that the attempted withdrawal of their

counsel and Intervenors' failure to send notice to Defendants of the need to
/1

retain new counsel provides a reason justifying relief from the judgment"
under 60(b)(6). The district court considered all of the circumstances and
refused to reverse the judgment for this reason. That decision was far from
an abuse of discretion. See Jones, 2009 UT 39,

if 27.

To withdraw without an order from the court, an attorney must serve
/1

on all parties a notice of withdrawal that shall include the address of the
attorney's client[s] and a statement that no motion is pending and no
hearing or trial date has been set." Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c). The trial court
22

found that the Notice of Withdrawal "was defective, and therefore
ineffective, because it did not include Defendants' address(es)." (R.1458.)
"This is not a mere technicality," the court explained, "because the address
requirement is directly tied to the other parties' ability to comply with the
notice to appear or appoint requirement and to communicate with
Defendants during this critical period of time."5 (R.1458.)
Additionally, it was undisputed that Defendants' counsel "continued
to receive electronic notice of all pending motions and hearings as required
by the rules" and there is "no evidence that Defendants did not receive
actual notice of the Expedited Motion, the December 23rd hearing, and the
Order of Sale or that Mr. James did not keep Defendants apprised of the
proceedings in this case." (R.1458.) In fact, there is indisputable evidence
that Defendants did receive actual notice of the ongoing proceedings,
including the sale to Mrs. Fields. The receiver told the court at the hearing
to approve the sale that Mr. Ryan has "been in communication with the
5 The notice of withdrawal was also "ineffective," the court said, "because
the Expedited Motion was filed the same day," and the essentially
"contemporaneous filing of the Motion to Expedite resulted in [a] pending
motion that precluded counsel for Defendants from withdrawing without
an order of the Court." (R.1459.)
23

receiver ... so he does know that this was coming down today." (R.1500.)
Further, Defendants were obviously aware of the sale because they referred
to it in their complaint against Mrs. Fields Franchising in the Ohio
litigation. (R.1045-46.) And at the hearing on their motion to set aside the
judgment, Defendants conceded that they learned about the Sale Order and
the termination of the receivership in January 2015. "And yet they took no
action to object for approximately two months," the district court
explained. (R.1046.)
"By failing to object when the first learned of the Order of Sale and by
accepting the benefits flowing from it, Defendants waived any rule 74
objection." (R.1046.) And such an objection can be waived. See Migliore v.
Migliore, 2008 UT App 208, 8if8if 16-19.

Finally, even if Defendants' counsel properly withdrew, the
moratorium is not unbreakable. No further proceedings are allowed until
21 days after the notice to appear or appoint counsel is filed "unless
otherwise ordered by the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c). In this case, the
court decided to move forward.

24

In fact, in this case a moratorium was effectively impossible.

A

receiver had been appointed and had taken control of the Companies. The
trial court could not simply put the receivership on hold; it had to keep
supervising the receiver's work. And time was of the essence.

As the

receiver told the court when asking it to approve the sale, the ice cube was
melting. The perishable assets at issue were perishing. (R.1502.) "[W]e do
need to strike quickly," the receiver said.

(R.1502.)

The district court

agreed and approved the sale.
And the district court was well within its powers of supervision over
the receivership to approve the sale even in the absence of Defendants.
"The receiver is an officer and arm of the court and acts under the direction
and supervision of the court," not the parties. Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697
P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1985).
A receiver has, under the direction of the court, the power to
take and keep possession of property and generally do such
acts respecting the property as the court may authorize. The
possession by the court of the res in a receivership proceeding
gives the court the power to determine all questions concerning
the ownership and disposition of the property.

Id. at 239-40.
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Additional facts make the district court's approval of the sale even
more appropriate, even though Defendants did not appear at the hearing
where approval was given. Defendants had stated on the record that they
trusted the receiver and said they "will approve" approve the sale to BBX
or to anyone else who made a "better offer." (R.1452.) It is undisputed that
the offer from Mrs. Fields was a far better offer, and the receiver told the
district court he didn't expect a better offer. This, plus the fact that time
was of the essence, makes it clear that the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
Plus, Defendants accepted the benefits of this sale without any
objection.

And Defendants have never argued that the sale was not

"commercially reasonable" or was not in the best interests of the
receivership. Instead, Defendants object only to a single provision in the
sale agreement-a standard release provision-because it negatively
affected their efforts to file a separate lawsuit. They do not dispute that the
offer that was accepted was the best for the receivership estate.
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For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it refused to set aside the judgment based on the attempted withdrawal of
Defendants' counsel.
III.

Defendants did not exercise due diligence - they exercised no
diligence. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
found that Defendants failure to object to the Sale Order was not
the result of "excusable neglect."
Defendants' final argument is that their failure to object to the sale

was the result of" excusable neglect." See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l). "A trial
court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown excusable
neglect, and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there
has been an abuse of discretion." Cadlerock joint Venture II LP v. Envelope

Packaging of Utah Inc., 2011 UT App 98, ,-r 9 (quotation marks, ellipsis, and
brackets omitted).
Excusable neglect requires "the exercise of due diligence by a
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances."

Asset Acceptance

LLC, 2016 UT App 84, ,-r 16 (quotation marks omitted).
While a party need not be perfectly diligent in order to obtain
relief, some diligence is necessary in order for the neglect to be
considered excusable. In determining whether a party has
exercised due diligence, the district court must consider
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whether the actions of the party seeking relief were sufficiently
diligent and responsible, 1n light of the attendant
circumstances, to justify excusing it from the full consequences
of its neglect.

Id. (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted). In other
words, excusable neglect exists "where the failure to act was the result of
... the neglect one would expect from a reasonably prudent person under
similar circumstances." Sewell v. Xpress Lube, 2013 UT 61,

if 29 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants' neglect is the opposite of what one would have expected
under the circumstances of this case. Defendants knew the receiver was
actively trying to sell the Companies' assets. They knew an offer had been
received. In fact, they had approved that offer. Yet, they consented to their
attorney withdrawing and then did nothing. They made no discernible
effort to follow what was happening. Mr. Ryan was told that a hearing
was being held to approve the sale of the Companies' assets, and yet he
took no action on his own behalf or on behalf of the Companies. The only
conclusion that can be drawn is that Defendants simply did not care about
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the details of the sale until a minute detail- the release - came back to bite
them.
The trial court carefully considered "the particular circumstances of
this case" and "all relevant factors" and concluded that "Defendants have
not shown that they exercised sufficient diligence .... " (R.1455.)
Defendants knew that Receiver had been appointed, BBX had
made an offer, and timing was an issue given the nature of the
inventory and the upcoming holiday season. Based on their
counsel's statements at the December 3rd hearing, Defendants
also knew the Receiver might receive other offers. Importantly,
there is no evidence in the record that Defendants did not have
actual notice of the Expedited Motion or the Notice of Hearing
or the proposed Order of Sale.[ 6 ] It is undisputed that all of the
relevant pleadings and notices were served on Mr. James. Mr.
Ryan never testifies that Mr. James did not provide him with
copies of these pleadings and notices. Instead, Mr. Ryan
testifies that he did not see the Asset Purchase Agreement before
the Court entered the Order of Sale on December 23, 2014.
There is also evidence in the record that Mr. Ryan was 1n
communication with the Receiver during this period of time.
(R.1455.)

6

In fact, as we have shown, Defendants had specific notice of the pending
sale to Mrs. Fields. The Receiver testified at the hearing to approve the sale
that he had been in contact with Mr. Ryan "so he does know that this was
coming down today." (R.1500.)
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Defendants note that the Companies could not appear without
counsel, but the trial court rejected that argument because there was
"nothing that prevented [Mr. Ryan] from attending the hearing [on
December 23, 2014] and alerting the Court to Defendants' concerns about
the proposed sale to Mrs. Fields .... " (R.1455.) The evidence shows that
Defendants were unconcerned about the sale to Mrs. Fields "until they
were confronted with the release language during the Ohio litigation filed
months later." (R.1455.) "This, along with Defendants' acceptance of the
beneficial aspects of the sale, does not support a finding that they acted in
good faith." (R.1455-56.)
In short, due diligence 1s determined by the circumstances.
Defendants exercised no diligence. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it concluded that Defendants' failure to object was the
result of excusable neglect.
IV.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
Defendants did not have a meritorious defense.
Finally, Plaintiffs also have to show that they had a meritorious

defense. "Mere proof of surprise or excusable neglect would be insufficient
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without some assertion of a meritorious defense ... as it would be an empty
formality to set aside a default judgment for a defendant who had no
chance of prevailing on the merits." Judson, 2012 UT 6, i-f 14. In this case,
the district court concluded that even if Defendants had retained new
counsel and timely objected to the sale to Mrs. Fields, their objection would
have lacked merit and the court would have approved the sale anyway.
(R.1456.)
As the district court pointed out, Defendants' counsel expressed
confidence in the receiver and approved of the offer from BBX or any other
better offer. (R.1456.) A much better offer did come. In fact, the offer from
Mrs. Fields was "nearly a million dollar increase" over the offer from BBX.
(R.1501.) The district court held a hearing and concluded that the offer
from Mrs. Fields was "the best and highest offer" and that "Defendants
received significant benefits as a result" of the sale. (R.1456.) Additionally,
the district court pointed out that Defendants said they would not have
objected to the sale itself. In fact, Defendants have never contended that
the sale was not an arm's-length, commercially-reasonable sale. They have
objected only to one provision that affected only them-the release that
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prevented their attempt to sue Mrs. Fields in Ohio. The district court said
it was "not persuaded that an objection to one provision of an otherwise
unobjectionable Asset Purchase Agreement is a 'meritorious defense"' and
that it would not have rejected the sale to Mrs. Fields "because of an
objection to the release language, particularly when the claim that
Defendants want to assert against Mrs. Fields is a claim that was an asset of
the receivership and was arguably being sold to either BBX or Mrs. Fields."
(R.1456.)
The district court's determination that Defendants did not present a
meritorious defense was not an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' arguments on appeal can be broken into two parts:
Defendants first argument is that after TAB's Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal, the district court lacked jurisdiction.

This argument, as

Defendants correctly point out, is subject to de nova review and does not
require Defendants to show a "meritorious defense" in addition to the lack
of jurisdiction. But this argument fails on the merits. Rule 41(a)(1) was
inapplicable when TAB filed its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal for several
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independent reasons: (1) Defendants had responded to the complaint by
entering an appearance through counsel, stipulating to intervention, and
opposing the appointment of a receiver; (2) Rule 41(a)(1) became
inapplicable when the court appointed a receiver because only the court
could discharge the receiver; and (3) Defendants had stipulated to
intervention, and the Intervenors were plaintiffs whose interest could not
be dismissed by TAB. All three reasons provide an independent basis to
affirm. Thus, even under de nova review, the district court's determination
that TAB' s attempted dismissal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction
should be affirmed.
The second part of Defendants' appeal is even weaker because it is
subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. District courts "have
'broad discretion' in deciding whether to set aside a judgment" under Rule
60(b) for non-jurisdictional reasons. Jones, 2009 UT 39,

ii

17. "A district

court abuses its discretion only when its decision was against the logic of
the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's
sense of justice or resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice."

Id.

ii
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(internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted). And the district
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court plainly did not abuse its discretion in this case. It exercised proper
authority over the receivership and was well within its rights to approve
the sale. It was the best offer the receiver could hope for, and time was of
the essence. And Defendants were simply unconcerned with the details.
Bank of American Fork respectfully asks this Court to affirm the
decision of the district court.
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